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Cross-national regulatory differences in safety, price and intellectual property 
protection are an inherent feature of the operating environment of the global 
pharmaceutical firm. Institutional, transaction cost and more recent ‘race to the 
bottom’ theories assume that regulation represents a cost to the firm; therefore 
firms  ‘vote  with  their  feet’  and  avoid  investment  in  stringently  regulated 
markets.  However,  a  cross-national  empirical  study  of  the  FDI  levels of 20 
firms across 19 markets reveals that regulatory stringency is not related to FDI, 
and price control stringency is positively related to FDI, when controlling for 
other  market  factors.  National  governments  are  not  powerless  in  games  of 
regulatory arbitrage, and have in fact developed adaptive strategies to maintain 
high regulatory standards and FDI simultaneously. Furthermore, global firms 
weigh  various  factors  in  their  investment  decisions,  and  suffer  from  classic 
optimisation  problems,  including  information  asymmetries  and  bounded 
rationality, which prevent total ‘regulatory optimisation’. The implications for 
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1.  Introduction:  Responses to Regulation  
 
The significance of business responses to regulatory diversity among countries 
is a topical concern, as well as an empirical quandary. A focus on regulation as 
a “non-tariff barrier”
1 has begun to enter the theoretical and empirical literature 
on international business (World Bank, 2000; PhRMA, 2000; Guasch and Hahn, 
1999; Hackett, 1998; OECD, 1997). Much of the literature on the topic assumes 
that  firms  interpret  regulation  as  a  cost;  thus  they  compare  regulation 
cross-nationally  in  order  to  invest  in  the  least  regulated  environments, 
eventually leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ in regulatory standards (Drezner, 
2001;  Drezner, 2000; Gray, 1998;  Nivola, 1997;  Cerny,  1995;  Stopford and 
Strange, 1991). Yet, is there empirical evidence that international firms respond 
to regulatory differentials in strategic ways? 
 
This  study  explored  this  proposition  using  pharmaceutical  industry  data  to 
conduct  a  cross-national  regression  and  post-hoc  qualitative  interviews  in 
relation  to  three  types  of  regulation:  safety,  price  control  and  intellectual 
property. It finds that in a stringently-regulated strategic industry, regulation is 
not related to FDI levels, and price control stringency is positively related to 
FDI, when controlling for other market factors. Further qualitative interviews 
reveal  that  national  governments  are  not  powerless  in  games  of  regulatory 
arbitrage,  and  have  in  fact  developed  adaptive  strategies  to  maintain  high 
regulatory  standards  and  FDI  simultaneously.  Furthermore,  global 
pharmaceutical firms weigh various factors in their investment decisions, and 
suffer from classic optimisation problems, including information asymmetries 
and bounded rationality, which prevent total ‘regulatory optimisation’.  
 
 
2.  Literature Review: The effects of regulation on trade and FDI 
  
While  much  of  the  economic  theory  of  trade  and  investment  developed 
independently of empirical hypothesis testing, some recent efforts at empiricism 
have  produced  relevant  results  (Leamer  and  Levinsohn,  1995).  Increasingly, 
empirical  insights  have  challenged  and  enhanced  economic  assumptions 
(Gusinger, 2001; Thompson, 2001; Maskus et al., 2000; Caves, 1996; Rugman, 
1980). Empirical testing of these economic theories, as they relate to regulation 
and institutional factors, roughly fall into two categories, based on the type of 
international economic activity: empirical explorations of the determinants of 
trade  (namely  imports  into  regulated  zones)  and  empirical  explorations  of 
country-level influences on FDI levels and foreign firm location choices.  
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Regulation and Trade 
 
First, the most developed of these empirical traditions has been econometric and 
bilateral gravity model studies of the impact of regulation and policy on trade 
flows. Quantitative econometric studies have included regression analyses of 
regulation and trade. Swann et al (1996) reported that, when levels of standards 
were regressed with levels of imports from 1985-1991 in the UK, a positive 
relationship  was  noted  between  standards  and  imports.  Thus,  the  authors 
concluded that standards signal quality and increase import demands (Swann et 
al, 1996).  
 
Additionally, micro-level qualitative studies have produced compelling results. 
The  OECD  conducted  a  study  in  which  it  asked  55  firms  in 
telecommunications, dairy products and automotive components industries to 
assess the extent to which technical regulations and conformity requirements 
were an impediment to trade (1999). The study reported diverse results for the 
sectors, with some reporting no influence on trade of technical standards, and 
others reporting large impediments across a small range of products (Maskus et 
al, 2000). Most estimated the standards-imposed cost increase in the range of 
zero  to  ten  percent.  Smaller  firms  reported  more  difficulties  with  meeting 
standards  and  were  more  deterred  from  entering  high-stringency  markets  or 
those in which the standards were unfamiliar, suggesting that firm-level factors 
such as size and resources also mediate the impact of regulatory standards on 
trade  (OECD,  1999).  When  asked  about  regulatory  agencies,  most  firms 
advocated harmonisation and some reported that competition among regulatory 
agencies had lowered regulatory costs to some extent (Maskus et al, 1999).  
 
The  United  States  International  Trade  Commission  undertook  a  set  of 
interviews with executives, trade associations and regulators in the information 
technology sector to ascertain the effect of divergent technical safety standards 
on  industry  trade.  Respondents  reported  the  costs  imposed  by  divergent 
standards (requiring a logistical challenge in sourcing components), regulatory 
delays and various labelling requirements as trade barriers affecting the sector 
(USITC, 1998). Moreover, many firms had in place their own internal quality 
assurance  systems  and  viewed  the  proliferation  of  further  standards  to  be 
redundant.   
 
Henson et al (2000) also undertook a qualitative study of the costs of developed 
world food standards to developing country producers. He found that regulatory 
standards on food imports were ranked as the most significant constraint on 
trade,  above  tariffs,  quotas  and  transport  costs.  Moenius  (1999)  regressed 
bilateral trade volumes on countries’ numbers of shared standards across 12  
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countries, and found that a one percent rise in shared standards leads to a 0.32 
percent  increase  in  trade.  This  suggests  that  more  similar  standards  among 
countries have a positive effect on trade.  
 
Regulation and foreign direct investment 
 
Trade  and  foreign  direct  investment  of  course  differ,  both  representing 
alternative  methods  of  entering  foreign  markets.  In  times  of  high  tariffs  on 
imports, these activities were commonly substitutes for each other, but more 
recently  the  motivation  for  foreign  direct  investment  has  been  to  create 
integrated subsidiaries, rather than to partake in import-substituting investment 
(Cantwell in Pitelis and Sugden, 1991). Subsequently, trade and FDI have been 
explored as two separate types of international economic activity. Similar to the 
work  done  in  the  trade  field,  the  consideration  of  the  role  of  regulation  in 
foreign direct investment choice has led to a rich hypothesis base and nascent 
empirical tradition. Caves, in his seminal survey of theoretical and empirical 
work in the area, details a comprehensive survey of empirical studies which 
consider the relationship between regulation or institutional environment and 
FDI  (1996).  Several  of  these  studies,  documented  in  Caves’  work,  deserve 
specific mention.  
 
Wheeler  and  Mody  (1992)  found  that  foreign  direct  investment  was  not 
necessarily  attracted  to  lower-wage  countries.  However,  when  adding  other 
human  capital  indicators,  such  as  literacy  and  education  levels,  some 
researchers found a positive relationship (Koechlin, 1992). Several researchers 
have  explored  bilateral  aggregate  foreign  investment  flows  through  ‘gravity 
models’; in other words, they attempt to explain aggregate investment flows 
between countries  through  similarities or differences in the  countries’  factor 
endowments. Brainard found, through exploring U.S. investment relationships 
with  other  countries,  that  differences  in  skilled  labour  endowments  are  a 
deterrent to foreign direct investment, while mutually high national income and 
population  levels  have  a  positive  influence  (1993).  Cantwell  and 
Sanna-Randaccio considered factor endowment levels and aggregate investment 
among European countries, and found that reciprocal patent holdings were an 
inducement to bilateral investment (1992).  
 
The potential effects of direct government policy and regulation, rather than 
traditional  factor  endowments,  on  foreign  investment  have  been  considered 
explicitly in several studies. A country’s openness to foreign investment and a 
supportive economic infrastructure have been found to increase FDI (Lecraw, 
1984; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Li and Guisinger, 1992). This includes factors  
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such  as  the  absence  of  restrictions  on  foreign  ownership  and  a  favourable 
macroeconomic climate, as well as special incentives to attract investment.  
 
Political risk, including governmental instability and conflict, has been found to 
have  an  ambiguous  relationship  to  FDI (Lecraw,  1984;  Wheeler  and  Mody, 
1992).  Additionally,  recent  studies  have  considered  the  role  of  supportive 
regulation,  such  as  intellectual  property  protection,  as  an  attractor  for 
investment, and found a positive relationship (Smarzynska, 2002; Park, 2001; 
Fink, 1999). And others find compelling regulation-specific localisation reasons 
for  firms  to  partake  in  FDI,  suggesting  a  positive  relationship  between 
regulatory  stringency  and  FDI.  Fina  and  Rugman  (1995),  in  a  longitudinal 
company case study of the Upjohn Company, found that the company invested 
abroad  to  avoid  barriers  to  trade,  but  also  to  “reduce  information  costs  in 
dealing with host country regulatory forces” (p.15).  
 
Tannenwald (1997) conducted a comprehensive survey of studies dealing with 
the  relationship  between  environmental  regulatory  stringency  and  economic 
activity, and reported that most studies find a statistically significant, negative 
relationship between regulatory stringency and economic activity on the part of 
firms and industries, including location decisions and employment; yet these 
estimated  effects  tend  to  be  small  (Duffy-Deno,  1992;  Crandall,  1993; 
McConnell and Schwab, 1990; Bartik, 1989). He suggests that the relationship 
is  due  to  the increase  in  production  costs  induced  by  regulatory  stringency. 
Additionally, the Tannenwald survey makes several important methodological 
points,  underlining  the  fact  that  while  measuring  regulatory  stringency  is  a 
difficult practice, there is valuable insight to be gained from progress in this 
important field. These studies are summarised in Table 1. 
 
A  review  of  the  history  of  empirical  studies  reveals  several  traits  of  the 
literature. Authors have focused on different country, industry or firm aspects, 
as  well  as  several  different  types  of  regulatory  field,  including  product 
standards,  supportive  subsidies  and  policies,  as  well  as  environmental 
regulation. Notably, import and trade studies tend to allow more time series 
exploration, due to the availability of this data across multiple years. However, 
FDI studies contain more strategic importance for governments attempting to 
attract investment to meet industrial competitiveness goals. There are several 
areas which would benefit from closer study: a focus on particular strategic 
industries, and in particular, industry-specific regulations; a focus at firm level, 
which  allows  firm-level  heterogeneity  to  be  explored;  and  a  focus  on 
well-controlled multiple regressions, which would allow exploration of market 
and regulatory factors. Thus, due to its strategic importance and the significant  
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variation in its regulation cross-nationally, the pharmaceutical industry has been 
chosen as a focus for study.  
 
Table 1.  Empirical Studies of the Relationship Between Regulatory Stringency and Trade  
or Investment 
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significant barrier than 
tariffs or transport costs.  







among countries increase 
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smaller firms more than 
larger ones. 
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Wage levels;  
good economic 
infrastructure 
FDI  FDI is not attracted to low 
wage countries; good 
economic infrastructure 
increases FDI. 





FDI  FDI is attracted to low 
wage countries when 





EU countries  Reciprocal patent 
holdings  
FDI  Reciprocal patent 
holdings increase FDI. 
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3.  The Regulation of Pharmaceutical Products 
 
The  global  pharmaceutical  industry  exists  in  a  regulatory  environment 
characterised  by  significant  cross-national  variation.  The  regulation  of 
pharmaceutical products has a documented history dating from the 5
th century 
BC,  when  regulation  of  Egyptian  pharmacopoeias  began.  However,  the 
guidelines  and  specifications  for  clinical  trials,  proof  of  safety,  intellectual 
property protection and the regulation of price have their roots in more modern 
times.  Modern  regulation  began  in  the  late  19
th  century,  when  laws  and 
regulations to monitor and license pharmacist standards came into effect in most 
developed  countries  (Braithwaite  and  Drahos,  2000).  While  certain 
commonalities have emerged in governments’ regulation of the industry, there 
are  still  some  distinct  patterns  of  regulation  among  industrialised  countries, 
creating  different  institutional  environments.  Table  2  summarises  the 
characteristics  of  the  pharmaceutical  regulatory  environment  across  19 
countries, which will be described further in this section.  
 
Table 2.  Summary of Country Pharmaceutical Regulatory Environments  
 







Australia  6.0  28.8  3.9 
Austria  4.0  33.0  4.2 
Belgium  6.0  34.0  3.9 
Canada  6.0  25.2  3.2 
Denmark  4.0  10.0  3.7 
Finland  5.0  36.0  4.2 
France  5.0  24.0  4.0 
Germany  3.0  30.0  3.9 
Greece  6.0  33.0  2.3 
Ireland  4.0  13.5  3.0 
Italy  7.0  23.0  4.2 
Japan  3.0  38.4  3.9 
Netherlands  5.0  21.0  4.2 
Portugal  5.0  54.0  3.0 
Spain  7.0  25.0  4.0 
Sweden  5.0  13.0  4.2 
Switzerland  3.0  30.0  3.8 
UK  5.0  15.0  3.6 
USA  1.0  11.7  4.9 
Total  4.7  26.2  3.8 
Source:  EFPIA, 2000; PhRMA, 2000; National regulatory agencies; Kanavos and Mossialos, 1999;  
Ginarte and Park, 1997. 
Note:   All values are for the year 1999 except the Intellectual Property Protection Index,  
which represents the latest-collected data from 1995.   
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The pharmaceutical industry is naturally a government concern. The industry is 
considered important from a government policy perspective due to its inherent 
position in public health programmes and its importance for national growth 
and competitiveness in a global knowledge-based economy (Govindaraj et al., 
2000). Health systems globally are facing a unique set of challenges as drug and 
other costs rise, populations develop greater expectations for new medicines, 
and emergent public health and security threats enter the public consciousness. 
Governments, equally, face changing discourses in industrial policy, with less 
focus  on  import  substitution  and  more  focus  on  developing  and  attracting 
successful  industries  for  local  needs  as  well  as  export  promotion  (Dunning, 
1997; Porter, 1990). The pharmaceutical industry finances in the range of 3 to 
36  percent  of  overall  pharmaceutical  R&D  within  most  countries,  and  is  a 
significant  contributor  to  overall  R&D-based  activities  within  advanced 
countries (Kanavos, 1999). Additionally, the industry itself can be a valuable 
source  of  employment.  Thus,  in  both  the  health  care  and  industrial  policy 
realms,  the  pharmaceutical  industry  and  their  related  products,  jobs,  and 
research  are  significant  foci  of  government  policy.  The  tensions  between 
regulating and promoting the industry are clear, and are one of the main focal 
points in the study of the relationship between regulation and foreign direct 
investment. 
 
Most importantly, pharmaceutical firms are rarely simply subject to domestic 
regulation.  Globally  minded  M&As,  joint  ventures,  research  partnerships, 
licensing agreements and subsidiaries mean that pharmaceutical firm managers 
increasingly face a plethora of different regulatory requirements and regimes 
(Dorris  and  Rosener,  2003).  Differences  in  national  regulation  as  well  as 
attempts to harmonise regulation internationally, both affect and are affected by 
the globalisation of pharmaceutical firms. Firms are subject to a ‘regulatory 
portfolio’, which includes both distinct and harmonised elements across national 
boundaries.  Most  significantly,  regulation  has  the  ability  to  constrain  or 
facilitate pharmaceutical business decisions and strategy, and according to the 
Ernst  and  Young  Life  Sciences  survey,  is  one  of  the  primary  concerns  of 
pharmaceutical executives as the industry enters the 21




In most industrialised countries, the systematic regulation of safety procedures 
and  requirements  for  pharmaceutical  product testing and  market entry  has a 
recent history (Comanor, 1986). Drug safety and approval regulation, similar to 
other types of safety regulation, was given impetus partly through high-profile 
disasters and partly through increasing pressure to regulate new technological 
advances (Braithewaite and Drahos, 2000). Most drug approval administrations  
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are  set  up  as  federal  institutional  arms  of  departments  of  health,  and  given 
statutory powers to regulate and enforce. To illustrate the regulatory stringency 
of the drug approval process, it is estimated that in the United States, for every 
10,000 chemically synthesised chemicals discovered, only one becomes a drug 
product  which  obtains  market  approval  (Reuters,  2000).  It  now  takes  a 
company, on average, $500 million or more to bring a drug to market, involving 
a development and approval time of 7-10 years (Centre for Medicines Research, 
1999).  
 
Over  the  past  four  decades,  drug  development  times  have  increased.  Safety 
regulation,  in  the  form  of  the  drug  approval  process,  has  now  become  an 
institutionalised  part  of  the  process  of  drug  discovery  and  development  in 
industrialised  countries.  Such  processes  exist  in  all  major  pharmaceutical 
markets. While the process used to differ considerably among countries, there 
has been significant harmonisation of technical requirements and procedures in 
recent years.  
 
Price Control Regulation  
 
Price controls across national borders represent a much more varied picture of 
regulation, both in the divergence of regulatory norms and in the techniques 
used  to  regulate  the  price  of  pharmaceutical  products  (Danzon,  1997).  An 
examination of price control regulation in the pharmaceutical industry globally 
provides  insight  into  the  way  in  which  different  regulatory  instruments  and 
norms  can  evolve  over  time  and  in  different  institutional  environments, 
reflecting divergent and changing national health priorities. Interestingly, it is 
one  of  the  few  regulatory  fields  surrounding  pharmaceuticals,  which  shows 
significant procedural variation, due to cross-national harmonisation in other 
realms. Additionally, since pharmaceutical tariffs were lowered or abolished in 
most developed nations by the WTO in 1994, price control remains as an area 
of strong government control in a market that has undergone significant trade 
liberalisation (Dorriss and Rosener, 2003).  
 
Average price levels on pharmaceutical products are available cross-nationally, 
but would be relatively meaningless as a measure of regulatory stringency in 
price.  The  difficulty  with  comparing  prices  of  pharmaceutical  products 
cross-nationally has been discussed thoroughly in the literature (Danzon, 1999). 
This is largely due to the fact that different countries have different product 
class  demand  profiles  and  other  market  factors,  which  determine  price  in 
addition to the regulatory process of price control. National price indexes for 
pharmaceutical  products  are  often  constructed  in  different,  non-comparable 
ways. Furthermore, the difficulty in using pharmaceutical price comparisons as  
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an indicator of government price control is also problematic due to the fact that 
pharmaceutical  prices  reflect  market,  economic  and  political  pressures,  the 
separation of which is difficult. Therefore, there was a close examination of the 
pharmaceutical pricing process as it existed in each of the 19 major markets 
identified for study. A basis for comparison became evident. 
 
An examination was conducted by reviewing the secondary literature on price 
regulation  mechanisms  for  pharmaceutical  products  (CMR,  2002;  Kanavos, 
2001;  Bailey,  2001;  Kanavos  and  Mossialos  1999;  Kanavos  and  Mossialos, 
1999b; Danzon, 1999; Gross and Ratner, 1994). Past research had identified 
many mechanisms used by governments to control pharmaceutical prices, and 
typologies  had  been  developed  (Bailey,  2001;  Kanavos,  1999).  Kanavos 
identifies  these  mechanisms  as  supply-side  measures,  proxy-demand  side 
measures and demand-side measures, each of which can influence the system of 
selling and buying pharmaceuticals and seek to limit price and/or volume of 
pharmaceuticals  sold  (1999).  Using  and  cross-checking  information  from 
various  sources,  including  trade  and  industry  sources,  national  regulatory 
agencies and market research organisations, it was possible to adopt and adapt a 
previous  typology  of  price  control  mechanisms  to  fit  the  markets  under 
consideration. Variability in the number of mechanisms used by governments 
became apparent in this typology.  
 
Non-weighted  indexes,  based  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  regulatory 
mechanisms  in  a  regulatory  field,  have  been  used  by  previous  researchers 
(Botero  et  al,  2003;  LaPorta  et.  al,  1996;  Ginarte  and  Parke,  1997).  
Governments, in the case of pharmaceutical price control regulation, use a range 
of mechanisms to limit prices. The reasons for this vary by country but, in most 
countries, government is also a purchaser of pharmaceutical products through 
national health systems or subsidised health provision plans, and therefore has 
an interest in controlling the cost of pharmaceutical products to the national 
purse. Notably, in countries with more publicly  funded health care systems, 
governments also have more monopsony power as a purchaser of drug products. 
A count was constructed by country of the number of price control mechanisms 
used by governments.  
 
Intellectual Property Protection 
  
Intellectual property protection is the protection of patents. Patents are legal 
documents  describing  the  rights  of  a  person  or  entity  to  use  a  scientific 
invention for technological or commercial reasons. The patent operates as a 
document of  ownership over  a  piece  of intellectual  property,  and  cannot  be 
infringed by other agents without a license or purchase (Park, 2001). Usually  
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ownership  of  this  property  is  temporary,  lasting  up  to  20  years  in  most 
countries, during the course of which time the owner has exclusive rights to 
commercialise the technology or invention on which the patent is based.  
 
Intellectual property protection is one of the most often-cited areas of regulatory 
importance  to  pharmaceutical  companies  (Europe  Economics,  2001).  As  a 
supportive  regulatory  mechanism  that  protects  the  property  rights  of  patent 
owners, the presence or absence of intellectual property protection has often 
been theoretically positioned as a crucial feature of the regulatory framework. 
This  is  based  in  the  economic  theories  of  Schumpeter  and  North,  in  which 
economic growth is assumed to be driven by innovation, which in turn is driven 
by the existence of property rights (Schumpeter, 1943; North, 1995). In the 
Northian world, there is no incentive for innovators unless intellectual property 
rights  exist  to  ensure  that  they  will  receive  returns  to  innovation  (Europe 
Economics, 2001). Yet governments vary in the extent to which they protect 
and  enforce  patent  rights.  Studies  have  found  that  this  variability  is  largely 
related  to  factors  such  as  levels  of  economic  development  and  measures  of 
economic freedom (Park, 2001).   
  
Due to the pioneering work of Ginarte and Park (1997), an increasingly widely 
used index of cross-national intellectual property protection is available. Their 
index is constructed in the following way. The national index scores lie on a 
scale of 0 to 5, with higher numbers corresponding to higher levels of protection 
(Park,  2001).  Ginarte  and  Park  created  the  index  by  reviewing  information 
about patent law and institutional mechanisms related to patent protection for 26 
nations.  They selected institutional features in  which  there was  considerable 
variability, due to the fact that many of the nations for which information was 
available and patent systems existed, contained some of the same institutional 
features,  which  add  nothing  to  the  index.  Similarly,  the  index  is  based  on 
‘macro’ legal features and is selective using the subset of legal features with the 
most variability among nations (Park, 2001). It has been used by several other 









This study tests the theory that regulatory stringency is negatively related to FDI 
using a multiple regression model. The main explanatory variables selected for 
inclusion are the length of the drug approval process, price control regulation 
and intellectual property protection. Thus, the hypotheses to be explored are:  
 
H1:  Countries  with  longer  drug  approval  processes  will  have 
significantly lower levels of foreign direct investment, all else being 
equal. In other words, the longer the drug approval process, the lower 
the level of FDI.  
 
H2: Countries with higher numbers of price control mechanisms will 
have significantly lower levels of foreign direct investment, all else 
being equal. In other words, the more price control mechanisms used, 
the lower the level of FDI. 
 
H3:  Countries  with  higher  levels  of  intellectual  property  protection 
will  have higher  levels  of  foreign  direct  investment,  all  else  being 
equal.  In  other  words,  the  higher  the  level  of  intellectual  property 
protection, the higher the level of FDI.  
  
Dependent variable: Foreign direct investment 
 
Foreign  direct  investment  is  defined  as  investment  in  affiliates  outside  the 
country of a firm’s headquarters for the purpose of production or market access 
(UNCTAD,  1999).  Currently,  over  500,000  foreign  affiliates  established  by 
over  60,000  parent  companies  exist  in  the  world.  FDI  is  a  growing 
phenomenon, with employment in foreign affiliates increasing from 30 to 35 
billion between 1996 and 1998, and global FDI inflows increasing at an average 
of 25 percent per year for the past decade (UNCTAD, 1999).  
 
Multinational  corporations  (here  defined  as  corporations  with  operations  in 
more  than  one  country),  continue  to  pursue  foreign  direct  investment  as  a 
strategy to enter and produce in foreign markets. FDI is equally important to 
governments  as  a  source  of  private  sector  investment  and  to  help  achieve 
industrial  and  development  policy  goals.  Foreign  direct  investment  usually 
consists of financing the “establishment, acquisition or expansion of a foreign 
affiliate” (UNCTAD, 1999, p.14). FDI is reflected in measurements of foreign  
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affiliate assets, FDI stocks and flows, numbers of employees by a firm in a 
country, and sometimes equity investments in existing local companies.  
 
Reliable data on disaggregated sectoral foreign direct investment is notoriously 
sparse. Challenges in government measurement capacity and comparability are 
rife,  including  the  absence  of  universal  definitions  of  FDI  and  limited 
government data collection. These challenges have been detailed at length by 
previous researchers (Falzoni, 2000; UNCTAD, 1998). OECD, the European 
Commission, the IMF and the UN collect data on foreign direct investment, 
however, none of it is disaggregated to the sectoral level of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  Yet  several  market  intelligence  providers  such  as  IMS  regularly 
collect information on how large, in terms of employee numbers, multinational 
firms’ affiliates are within host countries.  
 
Towards the beginning of this study, rich data became available from IMS on 
multinational firm level presence in many countries. IMS is a market research 
agency  providing  intelligence  to  the  pharmaceutical  industry.  Through  an 
agreement with IMS, data on firm employee levels by country was obtained. No 
other data source viewed was comparable to the IMS database in terms of level 
of  detail,  reliability  and  comparability.  Gathered  through  a  comprehensive 
annual survey of global pharmaceutical companies, IMS is a market leader in 
their field and so maintains a high response rate to their surveys, with data 
available for each of the top twenty companies in my sample.  
 
This study uses the proportion of a firm’s global workforce within a country as 
the dependent variable of interest
2. The reasons for choosing this proxy were 
twofold. First, the number of employees by country had been used successfully 
by other studies as a proxy for FDI (Greenstone, 1998; Keller and Levinson, 
1999; Kuemmerle, 1999). This proxy has in fact been noted by several studies 
to be a more realistic indicator of company commitment to FDI, in particular 
locations, due to the longer term nature of investment in significant in-country 
employment. Second, the expanded sample size of a cross-section of the data set 
(of 20 firms in 19 countries) would perhaps allow for more variation and a 
strengthened consideration of the hypothesis.   
 
Firm  sample  selection  posed  difficulties  in  that  pharmaceutical  firms  in  the 
global  population  cluster  around  very  large  in  size  or  very  small  (a  trend 
reinforced by recent consolidations). Therefore, the sample used in this study 
included  as  many  of  the  large  R&D-based  pharmaceutical  firms  for  which 
reliable data was available. This study attempts to investigate the activities of 
the largest R&D-based pharmaceutical companies, as their activities represent 
the majority of the economic activity of the industry itself (see Sample). In fact,  
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the  20  largest  firms  together  account  for  $308  billion  in  revenues,  or 
approximately 85 percent of the global revenues for pharmaceutical products. 
Figure 1 details the average firm FDI for countries in this study. In other words, 
firms’  foreign  investment  levels  in  each  country  were  averaged,  and  firms’ 
investments in their country of headquarters were excluded.  
 
Figure 1.  Average Firm FDI by Country 
 
Source:  IMS, 2000.   
 
Notes:  Employment levels are for the year 1999.  
  Means represent the average foreign direct investment levels of the top twenty firms in each country. 
Foreign  direct  investment  by  firm  is  measured  by  the  number  of  firm  employees  in  a  country 
normalised by the firm’s total number of employees. For example, firms place, on average, about 2 
percent  of their investment in Italy, as proxied by employee numbers. Employment in the firms’ 
country headquarters are excluded from the means (i.e. the US mean includes only non-US firms’ 
employment levels in the US). 
 
The  United  States  attracts  more  FDI  than  other  countries,  on  average,  with 
foreign  firms  installing  about  9  percent  of  their  employees  in  their  US 
subsidiaries.  Germany  attracts  the  second  largest  proportion  of  company 
investment, on average, followed by Japan. It should be noted that this indicator 
can give very little information about the purpose or function of foreign direct 
investment. In all of these markets, however, according to the IMS database, 
preliminary  testing  revealed  that  nearly  all  (i.e.  99%)  of  the  foreign  direct 
investments  represented  fully  owned  subsidiaries,  with  virtually  no  joint 
ventures. Additionally, though cross-border research partnerships between big 
pharmaceutical companies and smaller biotechs have become more common in 
recent years, those types of joint ventures were not represented by this database. 
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In other words, most of the investment accounted for in these data represent 
employment in a wholly-owned subsidiary focused on research, manufacturing, 
sales or a combination of all three (IMS, 2000).  
 
Independent Variables: Regulatory, Country-Level and Firm-Level Factors 
 
In considering regulatory and other impacts on foreign direct investment, many 
independent  variables  could  play  a  role.  A  review  of  the  theoretical  and 
empirical  literature  on  determinants  of  FDI  was  conducted  to  ascertain 
independent  variables  to  include  in  the  regression  model.  The  independent 
variables selected as indicators of regulatory stringency for the purpose of this 
study are drug approval times, price control regulation and intellectual property 
protection levels, as described in detail in the previous chapter.  
 
Previous studies and theories identify other independent variables for inclusion 
in the model. Market size was naturally found to be important in several other 
studies of new market entry and foreign direct investment (Smarzynska, 2002; 
Kyle, 2001; UNCTAD, 1999).  Actual pharmaceutical  market sizes  were  not 
freely available for every market in this study, so several proxies were explored, 
including population, GNI per capita and overall health expenditure per capita 
by  market
3.  GNI  per  capita  had  also  been  confirmed  in  previous  studies  of 
foreign  investment  decisions  to  be  a  reliable  indicator  of  development  and 
market  size  (UNCTAD,  1999).  Other  country-level  factors  suggested  or 
hypothesised in previous literature to be of importance were included, including 
corporate  tax  rates,  availability  of  science-skilled  labour,  and  labour  costs
4. 
Especially due to the fact that proportion of company employees in-country was 
used as a proxy for FDI, a labour costs index was used in the model to control 
for other factors affecting employment levels.  
 
Additionally, because the FDI data was at firm-level, a firm dummy variable 
was included to control for firm-specific effects on differences from mean FDI 
levels. Table 3 details all variables used in the model, their measures and data 
sources.   
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Table 3.  Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Notes:   i= firm, j= country.   
  All data are from 1999, except the intellectual property protection index, which was last measured  
in 1995 and drug safety approval times, some of which were measured in 1998. 
 
 
Variable  Measure  Source 
D E P E N D E N T    V A R I A B L E 
Foreign direct investment 
(Firm-level) 
proportion of company employees 
located in a particular country=  
employeesij / employeesi 
IMS Health, 1999 
(published 2000)  
I N D E P E N D E N T   V A R I A B L E S 
Country-Level Regulatory Stringency Variables 
Drug approval times  average time from product dossier 
submission to marketing;  
national and EMEA 
PhRMA, CMR, national 
drug authorities, 1998/1999 
Price control   number of price control mechanisms 
used by government 
Urch, Kanavos, Reuters 
Business Insight, 1999 
Intellectual property 
protection levels 
score on IP index  Ginarte-Park index, 1995 
Country-Level Market Variables 
Market Size  population  UNDP, 1999 
Level of Development  GNI per capita  UNDP, 1999 
Health Spending  government health spending per 
capita 
WHO, 1999 
Science Base  number of scientists and engineers in 
R&D per capita 
World Competitiveness 
Report, 1999 
Corporate tax rate  tax rate on corporate profits  national government 
information,  
Ernst and Young, 1999 
Labour costs  index of hourly labour costs  US Department of Labor, 
1999 
R&D tax credit  rate of tax subsidies for one US dollar 
of R&D, large firms (e.g. 1$ of R&D 
= x of a dollar in tax relief) 
OECD, 1999 
Market Competition and 
Health 
total number of pharmaceutical and 
generic firms active in market 
IMS Health, 1999 
Firm-Level Variables 




Table 4 gives the values of the additional independent variables under consideration in this study.  
 















Rate on Profit 
Index of Hourly 
Labour Costs 
R&D Tax Credit 
(Proportion of a 
Dollar per One 
US Dollar spent) 
No. of Firms 
Active in 
Market 
Australia  19.0  20120.0  2080.0  3357.0  36.0  82.0  .1  105.0 
Austria  8.1  25230.0  1919.0  1627.0  34.0  117.2  .1  115.0 
Belgium  10.2  25070.0  2122.0  2272.0  40.2  129.5  .0  136.0 
Canada  31.0  21720.0  2363.0  2719.0  44.6  86.3  .2  108.0 
Denmark  5.3  31770.0  2138.0  3190.0  32.0  125.8  .0  76.0 
Finland  5.2  25090.0  1570.0  2799.0  28.0  117.6  .0  72.0 
France  59.1  23990.0  2074.0  2659.0  40.0  95.2  .1  197.0 
Germany  82.6  25130.0  2382.0  2831.0  53.0  144.3  .0  317.0 
Greece  10.6  11730.0  1220.0  773.0  40.0  52.0  .0  100.0 
Ireland  3.8  22870.0  1583.0  2319.0  32.0  71.7  .1  95.0 
Italy  57.6  20130.0  1712.0  1318.0  37.0  87.2  .0  185.0 
Japan  126.3  35420.0  1763.0  4909.0  34.5  97.5  .0  181.0 
Netherlands  15.8  25260.0  2056.0  2219.0  35.0  114.2  .1  126.0 
Portugal  10.0  11190.0  1217.0  1182.0  37.4  33.3  .2  93.0 
Spain  40.0  14760.0  1215.0  1305.0  35.0  63.2  .3  177.0 
Sweden  8.9  27420.0  1731.0  3826.0  28.0  115.4  .0  89.0 
Switzerland  7.2  39650.0  2861.0  3006.0  31.0  130.4  .0  153.0 
UK  59.4  25200.0  1512.0  2448.0  31.0  92.0  .0  198.0 
USA  273.1  34370.0  4055.0  3676.0  40.0  99.5  .1  396.0 
Total Mean  43.8  24532.6  1977.5  2549.2  36.2  97.6  .1  153.6 




Selection of countries 
 
Initially, 220 countries were included in the database on which this study is 
based. However, this had to be narrowed to a sample of 19, depending on the 
availability of comprehensive regulatory data on countries. Thus, the dataset 
comes from a cross-section of 20 firms’ employment levels across 19 countries, 
for  a  total  of  265  data  points  (representing  firm-level  instances  of  FDI  by 
country) after accounting for missing data.  
 
While missing data has the potential to introduce bias into the model, this is 
only likely if there is a systematic misreporting of data (Chatterjee and Price, 
1991)
5.  There  were  two  missing  data  challenges  to  be  addressed  with  the 
dataset;  one  concerning  the  country  independent  variable  data  and  one 
concerning the firm-level FDI data (which will be discussed in the next section). 
First, some countries had to be excluded due to the absence of data (or reliable 
comparable  data)  on  the  regulatory  independent  variables.  Inevitably,  these 
were developing country markets in which pharmaceutical products were absent 
or in which regulatory data was not available or collected.  
 
This could introduce a selection bias into the model if it were generalised to 
explain  all  FDI  in  the  pharmaceutical  industry.  Therefore,  this study  cannot 
make generalisations about countries outside the sample, but focuses instead on 
developed  pharmaceutical  markets  with  institutionalised  systems  of 
pharmaceutical regulation; in other words, the industrialised, developed nations 
within North America, Europe, Australia and Japan which constitute a large 
majority of the existing active pharmaceutical markets. The countries included 
constitute  the  geographic  locations  of  approximately  85%  of  global 
pharmaceutical sales (as a proportion of total global revenues, which were $370 
billion in 1999). Based on calculations derived from IMS, IMF and OECD, the 
foreign direct investment represented by the firms and countries in the sample 
represents about 25 percent of pharmaceutical FDI globally (as measured by 
employee levels).  
 
Selection of Firms 
 
This paper uses the definition of multinational corporation espoused by Rugman 
and Hodgetts (1995): a firm with production or distribution facilities in more 
than one country
6. For companies, the 20 largest global pharmaceutical firms 
were  included  in  the  sample,  encompassing  85  percent  of  the  global 
pharmaceutical market in terms of revenues. This number represented a good  
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deal  of  innovative  and  sales  activity  in  the  industry  as  a  whole,  due  to  the 
consolidation  and  concentration  inherent  in  the  pharmaceutical  sector.  As 
explained by Bottazzi et al (2000), the industry operates from an “oligopolistic 
core”,  with  the  top  20  firms  in  the  world  initiating  80  percent  of  the 
introductions  of  new  pharmaceutical  products  onto  American  and  European 
markets in the 1990s.  
 
Therefore,  the  sample  did  not  aim  to  be  entirely  representative  of  the  total 
industry,  but  to  capture  an  important  economic  activity  (FDI)  of  the  most 
powerful actors. Additionally, because the focus of the study was foreign direct 
investment, firm investment levels in the country in which it is headquartered 
were excluded (i.e. employment levels by a firm in its own ‘home’ country were 
excluded from the database). Missing or ambiguous values were also present in 
the firm employee data. However, even within this sample, there were some un-
reported employee levels by some firms in some countries, which introduces the 
problem  of  whether  to  code  these  as  ‘zero  investment’  or  ‘missing  values’. 
Scanning the dataset and conferring with the database owners confirmed that 
the missing values were not systematically misreported or unreported, and it 
was decided to conservatively code them as ‘missing’ rather than ‘zero’, due to 
the larger potential bias the latter might add to the model.  
 
While random sampling is desirable, it is rarely achievable in social research 
(King,  Keohane  and  Verba,  1994).  In  summary,  the  resulting  sample  is 
inherently a representation of the largest markets and the largest global firms. 
The sampling procedure described above was used due to genuine econometric 
data limitations, yet every effort has been made to recognise any potential bias 
this may have introduced. While the policy and regulatory questions at hand are 
of most concern to countries with large pharmaceutical markets and to large 
global firms, caution must be applied to generalising the results of this study. 
The  decision  not  to  include  developing  countries  or  undeveloped 
pharmaceutical markets was made for practical reasons, and also to recognise 
that  regulatory  competitiveness  has  largely  been  a  concern  of  industrialised 
developed  nations.  Missing  data  were  dealt  with  in  ways  that  sought  to 
minimise  any  potential  bias  (Chatterjee  and  Price,  1991).  While  it  was  not 
possible  to  explore  the  situation  in  developing  countries  or  to  correct  for 
missing data in this particular study, future studies  may have the benefit of 
improved data sources and availability.  
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Table 5 details the characteristics of firms included in the sample.  
 







Firm Size  
(# employees) 
 










AHP    14    52289    86  1931  USA 
Abbott    16    71426    60  1937  USA 
Amgen    4    7700    18  1980  USA 
AstraZen    16    54600    56  1953  UK 
Aventis    20    91729    66  1858  France 
BMS    19    46000    48  1887  USA 
Bayer    26    116900    29  1863  Germany 
Boehringer    6    27980    44  1885  Germany 
GSK    30    100000    39  1830  UK 
J&J    33    101369    54  1886  USA 
Lilly    12    41100    42  1876  USA 
Merck    48    78100    32  1930  USA 
Novartis    19    68000    64  1860  Switzerland 
Pfizer    32    90000    64  1849  USA 
Pharmacia    14    59600    60  1886  Sweden 
Roche    16    63717    66  1896  Germany 
Sanofi Synthelabo    6    30514    100  1973  France 
Schering    4    25000    130  1851  Germany 
Schering-Plough    10    29850    50  1928  USA 
Takeda    8    13248    13  1781  Japan 
MEAN    18    58456    56  1892  --- 
Source:  IMS, Hoover’s, firm websites.  
Notes:   All data are from 1999.  
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Finalising the Model 
 
To test the hypotheses, the following model was estimated:  
 
Ln(empij/empi)  =  ß0  +  ß1DrugApprovali  +  ß2PriceControli  +  ß3IP 
Protectioni + ß4Ln(Pop)i + ß5GDPPCi + ß6HealthPCi + ß7TaxRate +  
ß8Science + ß9LabCosts  + ß10R&DTaxCred + ß10Compet +  γFirm + ηi    
 
Notes   
 
emp= firm employment (number of people); i= firm, j= country; ß= regression 
coefficient.  DrugApproval=  National  drug  approval  times; 
DrugApprovalEMEA= Approval times using EMEA for all European countries; 
PriceControl= Number of price control mechanisms; IPProtection= Intellectual 
property protection; Ln (Population)= Log of population; GDPPC= GDP per 
capita; HealthPC= Health spending per capita; TaxRate= Corporate tax rate on 
profits;  Science=  Scientists  per  capita;  LabCosts=  Labour  Costs; 
R&DTaxCred= R&D Tax Credit; Compet= Number of pharmaceutical firms in 




As detailed in Table 6, the model was estimated, generating an adjusted R² of  
.794. In order to test for the suitability of the model, a Durbin-Watson statistic 
was computed at 2.104, indicating that the independent variables represented 
stable and useful predictors of the dependent variable and that the error terms do 
not  display  problematic  autocorrelation.  Multicollinearity  was  minimal  and 
within acceptable limits. As can be seen in Table 6, the factors that significantly 
and positively affected foreign direct investment in this model were population, 
price control and competition (or number of firms in the market). The effect of 
population was strongest, while price control and competition both showed a 
slight but consistent positive slope. On the other hand, length of national drug 
approval  processes,  intellectual  property  protection,  GDP  per  capita,  health 
spending per capita and scientists per capita did not have any significant effect 
on levels of FDI.  
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Table 6.  Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Firm-level FDI = Ln (employees ij/ total firm employees i) 
  Coefficient  
(Standard Error) 
Intellectual Property Protection    -.179 
  (.149) 
Drug Approval Times    .007 




















Price Control    .185   ** 
  (.061) 
Ln (Population)    1.717  ** 
  (.241) 
GNI Per Capita    .000 
  (.000) 
Health Spending Per Capita    .000 
  (.000) 
Corporate Tax Rate    -.013 
  (.016) 
Scientists Per Capita    .000 
  (.000) 
Labour Costs Index    .000 
  (.003) 
R&D Tax Credits Index    .829 





































Competition (Number of Firms Registered in Market)    .005  ** 
  (.002) 





  .794 
  (.000) 




Durbin-Watson    2.104 
 
Notes:   Numbers in windows are regression coefficients.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
  i= firm, j= country.   
* represents p<.05 (none); ** represents p<.01.   
 
 
5.  Discussion with Insights from Interview Data 
 
Drug approval times 
 
No significant dampening of foreign direct investment seems to be related to 
longer  approval  times  under  the  national  systems.  Post-hoc  interviews  with 
industry experts and executives helped to discern some of the potential reasons 
for this result. They will be discussed in this section in relation to theory and the 
results of the regression model.   
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Insignificance of Drug Approval Times 
 
The negative finding in relation to national drug approval times could be due to 
the  fact  that,  compared  to  other  factors  in  the  context  of  foreign  direct 
investment  decisions,  national  drug  approval  times  are  comparatively 
unimportant. The possibility of this was borne out in the post-hoc interviews, 
with several respondents saying that national drug approval times were a small 
factor compared to others such as market size, and that more firms were relying 
on regional regulatory comparisons rather than national ones, especially within 
Europe  where there was  a significant  amount of harmonisation occurring in 
approval processes. In other words, the reason for the lack of significance of 
national approval times as a predictor of investment is that these distinctions are 
becoming  obsolete  as  the  regulatory  procedure  harmonises  and  centralises. 
However, different firms’ representatives had different views on the importance 
of drug safety regulation, a finding to be explored further in Section 7. One 
executive  in  a  UK  company  explained  that  regulatory  approval  times  are 
“extremely  important”  in  foreign  direct  investment  decisions  (Senior  VP, 
Global  Government  Affairs  and  Public  Policy,  European  pharmaceutical 
company, 2003).  
 
Another finding was that larger markets have more leverage in their regulatory 
stringency  due  to  the  fact  that  market  size  trumps  regulation  as  a  factor  in 
investment.  As  explained  by  one  respondent,  “In  the  US,  for  example,  one 
would not have expected that time to approval would affect investment. Even if 
there are delays, it is the biggest market in the world, so companies have about 
50 or 60 percent of their overall profits there. So even in the case where drug 
approval is delayed, which is not the case but this could be the case, one would 
not have expected significant problems for the countries regarding companies” 
(Academic Health Economist, UK University, 2003). The superior importance 
of market size as a factor in investment was borne out by the regression model. 
In this case, from the regression results, it is clear that multiple factors enter the 
decision  to  invest,  with  drug  approval  times  an  insignificant  consideration 
overall. 
 
Additionally, some interview respondents have emphasised that drug approval 
is the one portion of the regulatory process that is non-negotiable, and is taken 
as a ‘given’ in order to achieve market entry. Therefore, in all the main markets, 
drug safety approval times are not “discriminating factors” on which to base 
FDI decisions (Director of Global Public Policy, UK pharmaceutical company, 
2003). Instead, drug approval times constitute inherent institutionalised features 
of the market, which are already assumed. 
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Rather than being a deterrent to investment, some respondents emphasised that 
the drug safety approval system in a country can serve as an attractor if it is a 
“high quality” regulatory approval system, giving the company and its products 
a significant legitimacy benefit. Other researchers have noted that regulation 
can play this role (Gladwin, 1993). Some firm respondents suggested that more 
stringent  drug  approval  times  can,  in  certain  instances,  signal  a  strong 
country-level science base, which is an investment-attracting feature.  
 
Past research has suggested that firms make decisions from a starting point of 
‘bounded rationality’, often acting in less than optimal ways (Simon, 1982). 
While it was considered that perhaps firms do not have enough information 
about drug approval times for this to be a factor in their investment decisions, 
interviews  disconfirmed  this  possible  explanation.  Executives  and  firm 
representatives displayed robust knowledge about the drug approval process and 
length in different countries, with one executive explaining that she keeps a card 
in her wallet with the length of the approval process for each country in which 
her firm is considering investments or product launches.  
 
Several industry experts commented that the establishment of the EMEA as a 
centralised procedure for drug approvals (though still used in conjunction with 
nationalised  procedures)  could  possibly  have  been  a  reason  why  national 
approval times no longer have a dampening effect. It is difficult to explore this 
suggestion without time series data, and there are inherent statistical difficulties 
in using harmonised data in a cross-national study (allowing little variability). 
However,  according  to  various  sources,  the  national  approval  process  with 
mutual  recognition  is  still  most  widely  used  among  pharmaceutical  firms, 
though the EMEA centralised procedure is expected to become the most widely 
used in the future (CMR, 2002).  
 
Yet, another possible support to the suggestion that national approval times are 
not  important  comes  from  the  empirical  decision-making  literature,  which 
recognises that it is easier for economic actors to make optimising decisions 
among few options rather than among many options (Simon, 1982; Cyert and 
March, 1963). With the establishment of the EMEA and the single currency, 
perhaps  national  differences  in  drug  approval  times  are  decreasing  in 
importance  within  Europe.  In  other  words,  regional  harmonisation  may  be 
levelling potentially competitive regulatory differences nationally. Additionally, 
cross-regional  regulatory  comparisons  may  be  easier  to  make  than 
cross-national comparisons, according to Simon’s theory, possibly leading to 
more  optimising  behaviour  cross-regionally  rather  than  cross-nationally. 
Although it is impossible to explore within the scope of this study, this possible 
explanation deserves further research.  
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Price Control Regulation 
 
The  finding  of  a  positive  and  significant  relationship  between  price  control 
regulatory stringency and foreign direct investment was unexpected, given that 
it is contrary to the race to the bottom hypothesis, and to the economic logic of 
the firm as a short term profit-maximising entity. The  model was examined 
thoroughly  to  ensure  that  the  finding  was  in  fact  robust.  All  post-hoc  tests 
indicated  a  good  fit  and  substantiation  for  the  relationship.  Interviews  with 
industry executives garnered a near unanimous explanation for the positive and 
significant relationship. According to one expert,  
 
“the pharmaceutical industry agrees to invest in exchange for political 
capital  in  price  negotiations”  (Health  Economist,  UK  University, 
2003). 
 
Interviews revealed that the drug price regulation relationship between industry 
and  regulators  is  a  complex  one.  In  particular,  governments  and  regulators 
developed  bargaining  relationships  with  firms,  which  included  giving  firms 
more leverage on price if the firms would agree to invest in the country. While 
governments were able to attain their economic development and investment 
goals in terms of R&D, manufacturing jobs and industrial policy promotion, 
firms  were  able  to  achieve  some  degree  of  pricing  flexibility  in  highly 
price-regulated  markets.  Specific  country  examples  of  these  types  of 
relationships will be explored in the next section. 
 
Most respondents in the study viewed these inducements with a certain amount 
of disdain. One executive explained, “For years, governments have blackmailed 
us. They won’t let a drug on the market or give a good price unless we invest in 
a  manufacturing  plant”  (Senior  VP,  Global  Government  Affairs  and  Public 
Policy, European pharmaceutical company, 2003). Additionally, the bargaining 
relationship involving price and investment was used as a sanction if investment 
levels decreased. One executive reported having the price of their firm’s drugs 
cut  by  5  percent  when  the  firm  decided  to  close  a  plant  in  the  country  in 
question (Senior VP, Global Government Affairs and Public Policy, European 
pharmaceutical  company,  2003).  This  type  of  bargaining  was  extremely 
pronounced among European governments.  
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Furthermore,  this  process  of  regulatory  bargaining  was  usually  opaque  and 
negotiations were implicit rather than explicit, according to one industry expert:  
 
“You get perverse incentives. And it is all done with great subtlety. 
Even  verbally,  and  it  would  certainly  never  be  written  down.  The 
government regulator would say ‘You have a very big business, and 
while  we  don’t  assume  you  would  put  your  investments  here,  we 
notice that you don’t currently put your investments here. We think it 
would be a good idea if you would consider some more investment’. 
They say that as you explain to them what a wonderful new product 
you have and that you want to commercialise it. Then there is just a 
disconnect in the discussion and you are expected to understand their 
meaning. And then you get FDI in places like [Country X] and FDI by 
coercion if you… could gain leverage in things like technical approval 
and pricing. Some trading does occur. Only  major companies have 
invested in R&D in [Country Y]. Again, in [Country Y] nobody will 
respect you and treat you as a serious company if you don’t have a 
manufacturing unit there. The government simply reads off a list of all 
the  other  multinational  companies  who  have  manufacturing  units 
there. And the companies say ‘fair deal’... you have this enormous 
market,  we  want  to  get  into  it”  (Former  Director  of  Global 
Manufacturing Operations, European pharmaceutical company, 2003). 
 
However, several countries, notably the UK, France and Italy, use very specific 
formulae to set drug prices, which include levels of in-country investment by 
firms  as  an  explicit  factor  (Former  Director  of  Global  Manufacturing 
Operations, European pharmaceutical company, 2003). In France, one executive 
explained, if a firm built a manufacturing plant, they would receive another 2 
percent  of  profits,  and  for  an  R&D  facility,  another  5  percent  (Senior  VP, 
Global  Government  Affairs  and  Public  Policy,  European  pharmaceutical 
company, 2003).  
 
This  finding  is  important  for  several  reasons.  First,  it  negates  the  view  of 
national governments as powerless to set high levels of price control for fear of 
losing investment. In fact, governments, in the view of industry players, display 
high levels of adaptability and shrewdness in balancing industrial policy and 
regulatory goals, contrary to the race to the bottom hypothesis. Perhaps because 
governments, especially in European markets, are primary purchasers of drugs, 
pricing  is  a  crucial  domain  in  which  governments  have  taken  significant 
pre-emptive  measures  to  ensure  that  they  are  able  to  maintain  stringent 
regulatory and industrial policy goals simultaneously. This type of balancing 
allows them to weigh industrial and pricing policies in the balance in order to  
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maximise welfare. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, this fact is borne 
out by the evidence of the current study.  
 
Second, this finding is important because it revises the economic view of the 
firm as a pure profit-maximiser, as well as the economic logic by which firms 
make foreign direct investment decisions. Firms also balance competing goals: 
pricing flexibility versus purely economically-driven foreign direct investment 
per se. It appears that firms invest more in highly price-regulated markets in 
order to ‘buy’ favourable regulatory outcomes, especially if these markets are 
also large in size. While it was clear from the regression results that market size 
is a huge factor in determining investment, it is also clear that foreign direct 
investment is more than an economic decision made by firms according to pure 
market size factors; it can also be a bargaining tool in highly price-regulated 
markets.  
 
Finally, this finding is important because it revises the view of regulation as a 
purely linear process of regulation-compliance, and supports the process-based 
view that regulation is a complex negotiating process between regulator and 
firm. Governments and firms in fact possess bargaining powers and maintain 
negotiating relationships that are ongoing and in which regulatory outcomes are 
not necessarily pre-determined by the regulation itself.  
 
Intellectual Property Protection 
 
It was expected that intellectual property protection, as is so often hypothesised, 
would be a strong positive inducement to invest. However, this relationship was 
not substantiated in the current study, and quite significant variability was in 
evidence in terms of how firms’ investments were related to IP protection.  
 
Interview respondents gave several reasons for this outcome:  
 
1)  high intellectual property protection is assumed as a ‘given’ in advanced 
industrialised markets, and therefore is not a discriminating factor;  
 
2)  increasing cross-national harmonisation in intellectual property protection 
(most notably, through TRIPS
7) means that the advantage in locating in 
areas of high protection is disappearing; 
 
3)  industry looks for a stable, rather than necessarily high, IP environment in 
which to operate.  
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Regarding  the  first  two  points,  it  was  noticeable  that  intellectual  property 
protection displayed a lower degree of variability relative to that of the other 
two regulatory variables. In the main pharmaceutical markets, IP protection is 
usually  assumed.  Also,  due  to  the  TRIPS  agreement,  harmonisation  of  IP 
protection at high levels is expected to increase, which may be dampening the 
differential  advantage  of  investing  in  more  highly-protected  markets.  An 
alternative  interpretation  is  that  regulation  may  only  act  as  a  barrier  or 
inducement  to  investment  when  large  regulatory  disparities  exist  between 
countries.  
 
This outcome was, however, also interesting due to the fact that intellectual 
property protection is a regulatory domain about which the industry exudes a 
high level of rhetoric. When asked about the potential importance of supportive 
IP regulation, several executives gave detailed examples of how strengthening 
intellectual property protection had led to some countries being able to attract 
more  investment,  and  insisted  that  it  was  an  important  factor  in  their  own 
investment decisions, although it appeared insignificantly important based on 
the data used in the current study (Director, European pharmaceutical regulatory 
advisory body, 2003; Regulatory and Government Affairs Consultant, 2003).  
However, the possibility that this particular index may not capture the factors of 
importance to pharmaceutical companies cannot be ignored.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This  paper  explored,  through  a  regression  model  and  qualitative  data, 
hypotheses surrounding the relative importance of several regulatory variables 
in  the  foreign  direct  investment  levels  of  pharmaceutical  firms.  The  results 
suggest that regulatory stringency does not necessarily act to deter investment, 
and may in fact act as an inducement as part of a larger bargaining relationship 
between  regulator  and  firm.  The  type  of  regulation,  relationships  between 
regulators  and  firms,  and  certain  types  of  global  and  regional  regulatory 
harmonisation dynamics, may act to determine the role that national regulation 
plays in foreign direct investment.  
 
The implications of this study are threefold. First, at country-level, governments 
display adaptive strategies aimed at balancing industrial policy and regulatory 
goals (outlined in Table 7). The results of this study suggest that governments 
bargain (or can bargain) with companies to achieve their goals in the game of 
globalisation. Countries are not powerless pawns in a competitive deregulatory 
game,  and  do in  fact  exhibit  individual and  cooperative strategies that have 
helped avoid competitive deregulatory dynamics.  
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Table 7.  Classification of Country Strategies 
(Country-level strategies in high regulatory stringency/high FDI environments) 
 
Country Strategy  Strategy Characteristics  Example 
1  Leveraging Market Size  Leveraging large population, 




2  Leveraging Strong 
Science Base 
Offering government R&D 
support or fostering strong 
science education and skilled 





3  Leveraging Low Labour 
Costs 
Using comparative advantage in 
labour costs 
Spain 
4  Investment/Regulation 
Trade-off Approach  
Inducing investment (either 
explicitly or implicitly) as a 





5  International Regulatory 
Referencing  
Setting levels of regulation in 
partnership with other countries 
or through imitation to avoid 
differences that could lead to 
competitive deregulation, or 
harmonisation of regulation at 
high levels of stringency.  
US, EU, Japan — ICH process 
in drug safety regulation 
 
EU countries — EMEA, price 
referencing 
 
Germany, Italy, UK 
— parallel imports as a more 
stringent price control 
 
 
Second,  there  are  several  implications  for  theories  of  regulation  and  the 
economic  assumptions  related  to  regulation  as  a  cost.  Certain  types  of 
regulatory stringency in a firm’s ‘regulatory space’ are more important than 
others in foreign direct investment decisions. In the pharmaceutical industry, 
price control was the most salient regulation, but it was related to higher FDI. 
However, stringent regulation is not always a deterrent and may even induce 
foreign direct investment. Firms do not always view comparatively stringent 
regulation as a cost to the firm. In some cases, such as drug safety regulation, 
stringent  regulation  can  signal  a  well-developed  science  base  and  accepted 
technical standards, and can afford the firm a significant legitimacy value.   
 
Finally, at firm-level, this study provided evidence that multinational firms view 
differences  in  national  regulation  with  a  view  to  ‘satisficing’,  rather  than 
‘optimising’  in their  foreign direct  investment  decisions. Multinational firms 
exhibit  classic  limitations  to  optimisation  surrounding  regulatory  stringency, 
including bounded rationality, information asymmetries, multiple strategies and 
priorities which keep them from gravitating solely or  most heavily to lesser 




1   Beginning with the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 
significant and binding agreements were made among countries to lower 
tariff barriers; i.e. to lower charges issued on imports of foreign products 
into countries by foreign firms. Thus, many of the most onerous financial 
burdens on international trade have been removed, shifting the focus of 
scholarship to potentially enduring “non-tariff barriers”, in other words 
social  and  technical  regulations  and  policies  that  may  impede  foreign 
products.  
 
2   Thus, the numerical representation of this proportion is a number between 
0 and 1.  
 
3   In order to test the reliability of these variables as proxies of market size, 
they were correlated against the market sizes of those countries for which 
this data was available. Each was positively and significantly correlated 
with market size (Population, .952; GDP per capita, .706; GNI per capita, 
.729; Health Expenditure per capita, .771; all significant at the .01 level).  
 
4   Several theories suggest factors affecting firm globalisation. Robock and 
Simmons (1989) suggest the following firm motivations: market seeking, 
resource seeking, production-efficiency seeking, technology seeking, risk 
avoiding  and  counter-competitive  threat.  European  Economics  (2000), 
based  on  interview  and  industry  experience,  suggest  that  market, 
resource, and production-efficiency seeking are particularly relevant to 
the pharmaceutical industry. Thus, independent variables that represent 
these factors have been included.  
 
5   If missing data is random, we would expect the addition of the missing 
data to simply strengthen whatever relationships are found to exist in the 
model without the missing data included.  
 
6   “Transnational  corporation”  and  “International  corporation”  have  also 
been put forward as descriptors for firms with market focus that is not 
entirely domestic. This thesis treats these terms as equal, however with 








7   TRIPS, the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Protection, is the agreement signed in 1995 by members of the World 
Trade  Organization  (GATT  Uruguay  Round)  to  increase  protection  of 
intellectual property rights cross-nationally through multilateral trading 
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